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The European Union (EU) has vigorously pursed Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in line with the Post-Washington 
Consensus (PWC). The European Commission (2016) insists that trade liberalisation under 
EPAs will be conducive to development objectives enshrined in the ACP-EU Cotonou 
Agreement (2000-2020) and to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). According to 
EU officials, trade liberalisation will be win-win for both blocs, leading to growth, jobs and 
social prosperity. This optimistic outlook is, however, contested by numerous civil society 
organisations – and certain members of the European Parliament - who claim that EPAs will 
impose premature liberalisation upon former colonies (see European Parliament 2016 and 
NANTS 2015). Deprived of policy space to set robust tariffs to protect infant industry and 
sensitive agricultural sectors, ACP countries will, according to EPA sceptics, become losers of 
free trade. This debate is shaping negotiations for the successor treaty to the Cotonou 
Agreement and has prompted preferences among African states for intra-African trade 
liberalisation under the African Union and the African Continent Free Trade Area (ACFTA), 
as a precursor to EPAs.  
 This article examines the development implications of the EPAs in the case of West 
Africa’s cocoa sector. In so doing it critiques the EU’s embrace of private sector development 
(PSD) discourse to legitimise trade liberalisation. The European Commission (2015) promises 
that it will give aid to ACP private sector operations to ensure that they can compete on a level 
playing field in EPA liberalised markets (see Langan and Price 2015 for critique of EU aid 
modalities in West Africa). The EU is in strict alignment here with broader PWC norms of 
achieving ‘pro-poor’ free market reform via aid for developing countries’ private sector actors, 
as is enshrined in UN SDG 8. As existing critical literature on the PWC and the UN SDGs 
highlights, PSD discourse is a crucial lynchpin of contemporary donor thinking (see Onis and 
Senses 2005; Orbie 2007; Langan 2011; Fine and Saad-Filho 2014; Mawdsley 2015; Selwyn 
2016; Mawdsley et al 2018). PSD narratives enable donors to claim that poverty reduction will 
be achieved in free marketsin an egalitarian PWC phase of North-South ties. 
This article makes an essential contribution to the existing critical literature on PWC 
free market reforms by examining Nigerian and Ghanaian cocoa business people’s perspectives 
regarding the EU’s PSD claims in the context of EPAs. Drawing upon twenty-six semi-
structured interviews conducted in Ghana and Nigeria with business people – as well as civil 
society stakeholders and policy-makers surrounding cocoa production - the article demonstrates 
that while interviewees welcome the idea of donor PSD support, they have major misgivings. 
With the application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the article specifically highlights 
interviewee concerns about a lack of tangible delivery of EU PSD support; their fears 
surrounding premature EPA liberalisation; their perspectives regarding state intervention; as 
well as their concerns regarding the lack of trickle-down poverty reduction. The article thus 
provides evidence of interviewee perspectives in a crucial ACP private sector industry. 
Crucially, these cocoa stakeholder perspectives corrobate the critical scholarly literature’s 
existing scepticism regarding the ability of PSD modalities to bring about tangible pro-poor 
free market reforms in the PWC. As such, the article contributes original fieldwork findings to 
enhance and augment a primarily desk-based critical literature on PSD initiatives in relation to 
donor thinking in the PWC. 
The discussion is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of EU 
reliance upon PSD discourse to legitimise EPAs in alignment with PWC donor thinking, and  
provides justification of case study focus on West African cocoa and utilisation of CDA. The 
second section outlines key trends in the global cocoa sector, and in the national structures of 
Nigerian and Ghanaian production. The third section explores the views of business and civil 
society stakeholders gained during fieldwork in Ghana and Nigeria between 2013 and 2017. It 
underscores interviewees’ scepticism regarding the tangible delivery of PSD support. The 
conclusion provides a summary and reiterates interviewee perspectives with resonance for EU 
ties with ACP countries, and for donor thinking in the PWC. 
PSD discourse: marrying EPAs to ‘development’ in the PWC? 
Since the mid 1980s, the European Commission has emphasised the private sector as an engine 
of growth within ACP development strategies. Aligning to Washington Consensus neoliberal 
norms regarding the need for privatisation of sectors such as cocoa, the European Commission 
stressed the centrality of private business in the achievement of ‘development’ within free 
markets (Brown 2000; Hurt 2003). The EU’s discursive focus on PSD took on enhanced 
strategic significance with the publication of the 1996 Green Paper on Future Relations with 
ACP countries on the Eve of the 21st Century (European Commission 1996). Significantly, this 
document coincided with the launch of the PWC in response to criticisms of ‘big bang’ free 
market reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s (Onis and Senses 2005: 263).  
The 1996 Green Paper was a landmark publication in that it explicitly laid the 
groundwork for a shift from ‘non-reciprocal’ preferential trade under the ACP-EU Lomé 
Conventions (1975-2000) to the ‘reciprocal’ free trade agenda of EPAs under the Cotonou 
Agreement. This meant that ACP countries would have to ‘reciprocate’ open access to their 
markets via trade liberalisation in order to continue to enjoy low tariff access to European 
consumers. This contrasted with the Lomé Conventions which had granted ACP states 
preferential access to European markets while recognising their right to protect infant industry 
via tariffs(Brown 2000). The Green Paper claimed that in a Post-Cold War ‘more open 
international climate’, the partners could now state their ‘respective responsibilities… less 
ambiguously’ (European Commission 1996: 11). EU officials pointed to the alleged failures of 
non-reciprocity under Lomé, with the ACP share of total EU imports having fallen from 6.7% 
in 1976 to only 2.8% in 1999 (Dearden and Salama 2002: 905), and to World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) rules on trade reciprocity as being clear reasons for this paradigm shift 
(see Bilal and Szepesi 2011 for discussion of WTO regulations in African contexts). Hurt 
(2003: 174), however, argues that this latter justification demonstrated the EU’s attempts to 
‘externalise responsibility’ for its own policy preferences. He also rightly contextualises ACP 
countries’ declining share of EU trade in the Lomé era in relation to structural adjustment and 
concomitant industrial decline (ibid). 
The EU’s launch of the EPA negotiations under the Cotonou Agreement can therefore 
be traced back to the 1996 Green Paper, which also clearly articulated PSD discourse as a means 
of legitimating this shift to reciprocal trade. Notably, the document called for an ‘aid strategy 
centred on enhancing the competitiveness of the ACP economies and developing the private 
sector and trade’. It additionally explained that ‘job creation and social progress are intertwined 
with private sector development’, emphasising that poverty reduction could be achieved in a 
free trade environment (1996: x). This PSD discourse was soon confirmed by the European 
Commission (1998: 1-3), with the private sector hailed in neoliberal language as a ‘leading 
actor in development’ and as the ‘engine of economic growth’ within free markets. 
 Following this pattern, the EU’s PSD discourse was then central in the text of the 
Cotonou Agreement itself. The agreement states that EU aid mechanisms will help ensure a 
level playing field in a post-EPA environment through overt support to PSD initiatives in ACP 
countries. In one notable passage, it promises that: 
ACP–EC cooperation strategies at national and, where appropriate, at regional 
levels shall aim at… achieving rapid and sustained job-creating economic growth, 
developing the private sector, increasing employment, [and] improving access to 
productive economic activities and resources (European Commission 2000: 38). 
 
More recently, in the context of the UN SDGs, the European Commission (2016) has stressed 
that PSD will be crucial in achieving the post-2015 agenda. 
 It is important to recognise, however, that the EU’s embrace of PSD discourse reflects 
a wider donor trend in relation to the PWC from the late 1990s onwards. Responding to 
criticisms of social malaise under ‘big bang’ reforms during the Washington Consensus, 
influential development thinkers – notably Joseph Stiglitz – advocated a paradigm shift (Fine 
and Saad-Filho 2014; Onis and Senses 2005). The ensuing PWC championed the idea that 
donor institutions could intervene to correct market failures and soften the social impact of free 
market reforms. In particular, Stiglitz maintained that donors should intervene to assist private 
sector actors, with a view to making markets work more effectively through technological 
innovation and improvements to supply-side capacities (Onis and Senses 2005: 278). Free 
market reform could thus be translated into poverty reduction through donor interventions to 
assist business. In this context, institutions such as USAID came to embrace PSD rationales 
from the late 1990s onwards (Schulpen and Gibbon 2002). And moreover, PSD as a crucial 
lynchin of the PWC has been recently confirmed within the UN SDGs. Goal 8 explicitly 
highlights the need for donors to assist PSD initiatives to make markets work for the poor 
(Mawdsley et al 2018).  
A body of critical scholarly literature has however questioned whether PSD strategies 
can meaningfully ‘square the circle’ and translate free market reforms into poverty reduction 
in the PWC (see for instance Onis and Senses 2005; Orbie 2007; Langan 2011; Fine and Saad-
Filho 2014; Mawdsley 2015; Mawdsley et al 2018). Donors’ embrace of PSD discourse is 
perceived as a hollow attempt to repackage premature free market reforms as being 
advantageous to developing countries. In reality,  liberalisation is to the benefit of donor nations 
and their corporate actors wishing to sell to developing countries’ citizens or to invest in their 
lucrative extractive industries. A detailed overview of this critical literature undertaken by 
Mawdsley et al (2018: 40) succinctly encapsulates the main concerns as follows: 
private sector-led strategies for “development” may indeed produce 
improvements in “headline” growth figures… However, the evidence to date 
suggests that the overwhelming beneficiaries of this growth are, or are likely to 
be, corporate elites… Breezy [donor] statements about “inclusive growth”… are 
not backed up… Rather, current aid discourses repeatedly assert and assume a 
confluence of interests between all parties, and a “natural” translation of “growth” 
into “development.” 
This scepticism regarding ‘pro-poor’ free market reform in the PWC can be readily 
identified in the context of the EPAs. Despite legitimating EU PSD discourse, the shift to 
reciprocal free trade via EPAs has been the subject of fierce contestation, particularly in West 
Africa. Proposals for tariff liberalisation across 80% of total commodity lines has met with 
deep concern among West African civil society organisations (CSOs) such as the National 
Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS) (Trommer 2011, 2014). Such entities are concerned 
that an EPA will threaten the region’s prospects for value addition and industrialisation. 
Specifically, many CSOs and industry associations, including NANTS, advance the argument 
that premature tariff liberalisation will ‘kick away the ladder’ of development, by flooding West 
African markets with cheaper European goods (c.f. Chang 2003). This, they claim, will lead to 
the closure of local manufacturing and stifle agro-processing opportunities.  
Due in large part to such concerns, the Cotonou Agreement’s original EPA deadline of 
31st December 2007 passed without conclusion of a regional deal. Instead, a number of national 
‘interim’ EPAs were signed with individual West African countries. These arrangements 
safeguarded the signatories’ low tariff access into Europe in return for their commitment to 
eventual tariff liberalisation (Andriamananjara et al 2009). Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire for 
instance, both initialled interim EPAs to ensure that their exporters continued to enjoy low tariff 
access to the EU. Others such as Nigeria, however, refused and defaulted to the less-favourable 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). This disparity was keenly felt in the cocoa sector. 
Nigerian cocoa processors found that tariffs into European markets rose overnight, while their 
competitors in Ghana (and Côte d'Ivoire) continued to enjoy lower tariffs (ibid). This meant 
that, comparatively, Nigerian processed cocoa products became less competitive – providing a 
warning of what would be in store if a regional EPA was not signed.  
 
Significantly, delays in the regional negotiations prompted the EU to issue an ultimatum 
in 2011 to relegate any state that had not concluded an EPA, or interim EPA, to the GSP 
(Agritrade 2011). This reignited the EPA process, with West African countries collectively 
agreeing to a regional EPA in July 2014. Their acquiescence was facilitated by the EU’s 
promise to finance an EPA Development Programme (EPADP), with €6.5 billion of Aid for 
Trade. The EPADP seemingly ensures that key export industries – such as cocoa - will receive 
PSD support for their supply-side capacity in a post-EPA context (see Langan and Price 2015 
for detailed discussion). The underlying rationale is that enhanced productivity will compensate 
for losses in import-competing sectors that struggle (or collapse) in the wake of tariff 
dismantling. Interestingly, however, inspite of the West African Heads of Governments’ 2014 
agreement in principle to the terms of an EPA, this has not yet translated into actual full 
implementation. Ratification is still underway in individual West African parliaments (ibid), 
with the interim  ‘stepping stone’ EPAs signed with Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana continuing to be 
provisionally applied (European Commission 2018)  
It is in this context that the article focuses on the case study of Nigerian and Ghanaian 
cocoa. The industry, involving both smallholder production and value addition via 
processing,provides an important example of a strategic export sector. Both Ghana and Nigeria 
have prioritised cocoa exports within their respective national development plans (Republic of 
Ghana 2011, 2015; Federal Republic of Nigeria 2013). In Nigeria especially, authorities in 
Abuja have recognised the dangers of over-reliance on oil revenues and have belatedly sought 
to rectify the beleaguered cocoa industry (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2013). As such its new 
Agriculture Promotion Policy 2016-2020 presents a ‘Green Alternative’ to develop 
agribusiness (FMARD 2018). The choice of Nigeria and Ghana as case study countries, 
moreover, is interesting in terms of understanding the position of West African states that either 
resisted or accepted an interim EPA arrangement. In fact cocoa was situated as a cause célèbre 
at the time of the original EPA deadline in December 2007 since Ghanaian cocoa exporters 
continued to enter the EU without encumberance whereas Nigerian cocoa counterparts suffered 
from the default to the GSP (ICTSD 2008; Solidar 2008).  
Fieldwork in the cocoa sector in Nigeria and Ghana is therefore illustrative of 
controversies associated with the EU EPA agenda, and PSD discourse in the broader PWC. 
Twenty-six semi-structured interviews were conducted with business and civil society 
stakeholders. The interviews predominantly focused on perspectives regarding the ability of 
EU aid to tangibly assist the cocoa sector and the wider economy; as well as perspectives 
regarding EPA negotiations. This provided the authors with ‘snapshots’ of informed local 
opinion concerning the contribution of EU PSD efforts to poverty reduction – and the likely 
impact of the EPA. The interviews were conducted during a series of visits from late 2013 to 
summer 2017. This time period coincided with a number of landmark events in the ACP-EU 
relationship. Namely, the decision of the West African Heads of Government to agree in 
principle the terms of a regional EPA took place in July 2014. Meanwhile, the opening of 
negotiations for a successor to the Cotonou Agreement began in July 2016, with the European 
Commission’s (2016) publication of its evaluation of Cotonou’s performance. Additionally, 
engagement with business people also enabled informed questioning regarding government 
strategies, for instance national development plans. Anonymity was granted given the fact that 
interviewees addressed commercially sensitive issues, as well as controversies surrounding 
government and donor performance. The interviews help to mitigate excess focus on ‘macro’ 
trade structures with a more qualitative concern with the experiences of actors who comprise 
trade networks (Belfrage and Hauf 2015; Jessop 2012).  
The analysis of the interviews was facilitated by a CDA perspective concerned with the 
role of language and discourse in the (re)construction of power relationships, in this case 
between the EU and its ACP ‘partners’. A CDA approach allowed the authors to first 
problematise how PSD narratives helped to construct ‘common sense’ acceptance of ACP-EU 
trading structures as being legitimate, normal, or deserved despite the fact that PSD visions of 
‘pro-poor’ economic growth may not bear out in terms of material realities for supposed 
beneficiaries (see Fairclough 1989; Fairclough 2003; Fairclough 2005; Van Djik 1993; Van 
Djik 2005; Wodak 2002). CDA then enabled the authors to systematically analyse the 
interviews transcripts, through keywords relating to the normative premise of donor PSD 
assistance. This included, for example, ‘poverty’, ‘development’, ‘growth’, ‘prosperity’, 
‘social’, and ‘equality’. With CDA’s attention to the role of language in constructing 
legitimacy, the article itself thus sheds critical light onto official EU PSD discourse through 
consideration of the narratives of the cocoa interviewees in West Africa, deemed to be the 
ostensible beneficiaries of EU interventions. It also helps illuminate wider debates concerning 
the role of PSD in translating free market reform into pro-poor outcomes in the timeframe of 
the PWC.  
Before examining stakeholder narrativesit is first necessary to provide a contextual 
overview of the macro trends of the global cocoa market, and the structure of the industry in 
both case study countries. In doing so, the article does not adopt a Global Value Chain (GVC) 
approach often associated with the analysis of commodities in North-South trade structures, but 
instead adopts the critical CDA lens to highlight the power of discourse within the North-South 
interactions that underpin structural inequalities in the global economy. The next section 
provides key empirical detail prior to the qualitative examination of cocoa stakholder 
perspectives on EU PSD rationales in the context of EPA negotiations.  
Cocoa production in Ghana and Nigeria: global trends and national structures 
Cocoa’s position as a priority site of private sector activity is underscored by regional and 
global trends, as well as the bespoke structures of the Ghanaian and Nigerian sectors. The 
majority of world cocoa production originates from Africa, with the main producers being West 
African states notably Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon (Fountain  and Hütz-
Adams 2018; World Cocoa Foundation 2014). The global market has suffered turbulence. 
Cocoa prices experienced a significant shock in 2016/2017, which diminished the value of the 
export trade. Despite this, Côte d’Ivoire maintained its position as the world’s largest exporter 
of raw and roasted beans, although with significant fluctuations in the value of its export trade 
between 2014 to 2018. Ghanaian export values have risen significantly securing its position as 
the world’s second largest exporter of raw and roasted beans. However, Nigeria has seen the 
value of its export trade reduced by over half between 2014 and 2018 (ITC 2019). At the same 
time the position of EU member states as the leading importers of cocoa raw beans and products 
has been secured, led by the Netherlands and Germany, with the USA failing into third place 
in 2018 (ITC 2019). France, UK and Belgium, are the fourth, fifth and sixth largest importers 
respectively (Ibid).  
Interestingly, trade between West Africa and the EU, the world’s largest cocoa 
consuming region, is the most significant inter-regional exchange in the global cocoa 
marketplace. In total, over 80% of EU imports of cocoa and cocoa products originate from 
West Africa (International Cocoa Organisation 2012; CBI 2016: 6). Despite the strength of the 
EU market, however, there has been an overall stagnation of global demand for cocoa. Contrary 
to projections, demand stabilised rather than grew between 2012 and 2016, due to weaker 
growth than expected in potential Chinese and Indian markets, and a shrinking USA market 
(Fountain and Hütz-Adams 2018: 10). This stagnation,,coupled to a sharp rise in 
production,precipitated price shocks in 2016/17, with some smallholder farmers experiencing 
a 30% - 40% income decline (Fountain and Hütz-Adams 2018: 3). The effects in Ghana, 
however, were partially offset in relation to interventionist price mechanisms operated there. 
Increases in production, meanwhile, have had environmental costs, with Fountain and Hütz-
Adams (2018) stating that over ninety per cent of West African original forests have been 
destroyed.  
Within the sector as a whole, moreover, there has been significant corporate 
consolidation as a limited number of processors and chocolate companies have established 
themselves as lead firms (Barrientos 2014: 792). Large-scale European and US conglomerates 
now dominate the sector. In 2017 the largest chocolate producers were Mondelez International, 
Nestle, Mars, Hersheys and Ferrero, while the largest traders and grinders were Barry 
Callebaut, Olam, Cargill, Ecom, Sucden, and Touton (Fountain and Hütz-Adams 2018: 42). 
Although in West Africa smallholders lead in the production of raw cocoa beans, these major 
cocoa trading hourses dominate the intermediary trade in beans. Europe’s influential 
confectionary body CAOBISCO is itself dominated by a few lead European conglomerates 
which also dominate the global export of chocolate (World Cocoa Foundation 2012).  
 The majority of the processing (‘grinding’) of West Africa’s raw cocoa beans into 
liquor, cake, butter and powder largely takes place in Europe, which as whole comprises nearly 
40% of the global processing market (CBI 2016:4). This accounts for the dominance of 
European member states in the import of raw cocoa. The largest grinders Cargill and Olam  are 
located in the Netherlands, while Barry Callebaut is located in Belgium and France. The 
dominance of Cargill and Olam accounts for the Netherland’s status as the biggest single 
processing country in the global cocoa market ( CBI 2016: 4). These multinational processors 
subsequently act as key exporters of processed cocoa produce, mainly to other EU members 
(Port of Rotterdam 2016).  
However, the potential value of increasing cocoa processing within the West African 
region should not be underestimated. Indeed,  the ‘origin grinding’ of cocoa beans within the 
region itself has been increasing. State-led policies have supported this diversification, 
encouraging PSD in the export of semi-finished and finished cocoa products (Traore´ 2009). 
As part of this diversification, many West African states have proactively welcomed FDI into 
local processing capacity (International Cocoa Organization, 2012). FDI and adjacent 
technological inputs are seen to be of central importance for the development of West African 
origin grinding, and the region’s ability to capitalise on the vibrancy of the global market.  
Openness to FDI as part of PSD strategies in cocoa is reflected in the national plans of 
both Ghana and Nigeria (Republic of Ghana 2011; Federal Republic of Nigeria 2013). 
However, the two countries adopted distinctive approaches in terms of the structure of their 
cocoa production. Most noticeably, Ghana resisted full free market reform and has maintained 
significant government ownership within key stages. This is despite the wide-scale 
liberalisation that took place in sub-Saharan Africa via structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) implemented in the Washington Consensus (Gilbert 2009). Conversely, Nigeria 
followed the wider African trend and has pursued full liberalisation. As a result, the Nigerian 
government largely absented itself from direct investment and ownership in the sector 
(Ajetomobi 2014: 9).  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Ghana did embrace partial liberalisation of the 
cocoa sector. For example, there were reforms of the intermediary trade in raw cocoa beans 
from the farm-gate to the ports, with CocoBod (the government-owned cocoa agency) yielding 
this activity to private Licensed Buyer Companies (LBCs). These LBCs are mostly owned by 
Ghanaian entrepreneurs, who have sought to keep international trading houses at bay (Anang 
2011: 465-468). CocoBod, meanwhile, has maintained control of cocoa marketing via its 
subsidiary, the Cocoa Marketing Company. Importantly in the context of the recent price shock, 
this ensured that the prices paid to farmers were maintained at pre-collapse levels (Fountain 
and Hütz-Adams 2018: 7) Moreover, since 2003, the Ghanaian state has invested heavily in 
domestic processing via the Cocoa Processing Company (CPC), a majority state-owned entity 
that possesses two processing plants, as well as a confectionary factory(GoldenTree 2016).  
 Even within the partially liberalised Ghanaian sector multinational companies have 
taken a lead role in the increase of origin grinding (Anang 2011: 465). Barry Callebaut invested 
in a new processing factory in Tema, while the German grinding company Host-Hammester 
entered into a joint venture with CocoBod. FDI ventures have represented the majority of cocoa 
processing activity in Ghana, facilitated through generous tax exemptions offered to foreign 
capital. The focus of Ghana’s FDI projects has been semi-processed goods, in contrast to the 
strategy of the state-run CPC which prides itself upon the processing (and export) of finished 
produce such as the GoldenTree chocolate bar (GoldenTree 2016). 
In Nigeria more extensive liberalisation has encouraged the entry of foreign-owned 
trading houses into the intermediary trade in cocoa beans. Nigerian entrepreneurs do operate in 
this sub-sector but the majority of co-operatives sell directly to foreign-owned trading houses 
(Ajetomobi 2011: 7). Critical scholars such as Cadoni (2013: 7-8) argue that this has brought 
about a decline in the quality of the raw beans. Smallholder producers have endured price 
declines, which Cardoni attributes to the dismantling of the Nigerian Cocoa Board, the entry of 
mutlinationals and the relaxation of export quality controls under SAPs (ibid). Moreover, there 
are concerns that multinationals have drove down the local price of raw beans in a hierarchical 
relationship with intermediary firms and producers. This is seen to have had a detrimental 
impact on the well-being of poorer smallholders (Cadoni 2013; Ajetomobi 2011). 
Despite the unique structure of the Ghanaian and Nigerian cocoa sectors, both have 
converged around policy preferences for promoting strategic forms of private sector activity in 
cocoa agro-processing (origin grinding). The emphasis on diversification into semi-finished 
and finished goods has a stated developmental aspect to combat over-reliance upon the export 
of raw cocoa beans and spur poverty reduction. In terms of Cotonou and the EU-Africa 
relationship, this approach chimes with the EU’s focus upon PSD interventions within strategic 
export sectors as the engine of ACP development in the PWC. Nevertheless, the impact of 
EPAs and Europe’s PSD largesse requires closer analysis. Engagement with local stakeholder 
perspectives in the cocoa sector provides us with illustrative snapshots regarding PSD 
rationales.. 
Examining West African stakeholders’ narratives: PSD and EPAs for poverty reduction? 
Examining West African cocoa interviewees’ narratives regarding the contributions of the 
sector to poverty reduction can shed critical insight regarding the strategic role of EU PSD 
discourse in the PWC. The authors conducted twenty-six interviews with West African cocoa 
producers, processors, sector officials and civil society representatives in December 2013, 
October 2014, June 2015 and June 2017. The semi-structured interviews asked participants 
about the state of the cocoa industry in Ghana and Nigeria, about ongoing government 
interventions to assist the private sector, about the impact of EU trade and development policies 
for cocoa production and processing, as well as about broader views regarding strategies for 
poverty reduction. In particular, the interviews gauged local perspectives on the imminent 
regional EPA, as well as legitimacy-enhancing EU promises of PSD in vital export sectors. 
 When analysing the interviews, it is immediately apparent that there was a degree of 
convergence between EU officials and West African interviewees. Interviewees broadly 
concurred with the underlying rationale of PSD discourse that flourishing business 
communities can contribute to poverty reduction in the PWC. However, a number of serious 
caveats were raised, for instance, in terms of the ability of smallholders to adequately benefit 
from cocoa production in systems dominated by largescale predatory firms. Moreover, there 
was much scepticism surrounding national government and donor (EU) efforts to support 
private sector actors. Interviewees’ experiences in the cocoa sector left them unconvinced that 
EU PSD monies (while welcome) would be tangibly delivered. And they queried the 
fundamental premise of EPA trade liberalization,which many viewed as premature and a threat 
to the cocoa sector and the wider economy. Accordingly, the article now considers three key 
themes emerging within the interviews: i. a qualified interviewee convergence with donor PSD 
rationales; ii. a cautious welcoming of government PSD assistance; and iii. scepticism 
surrounding EU PSD promises and fears surrounding the tying of aid to detrimental EPAs. 
A qualified convergence with donor PSD rationales  
West African cocoa sector interviewee’s own narratives often aligned to EU PSD discourse on 
the importance of business growth for social prosperity. For example, one Ghanaian civil 
society activist involved in trade justice campaigns explained that: 
Cocoa… is a lifeline and bloodline to the economy… the cocoa industry helps 
people at the grassroots, to transform rural communities and dilapidated structures 
…in Kumasi [Ghanaian city]… cocoa holds the key to our poverty reduction 
(Interview A; October 2014). 
This view was further expressed by a Ghanaian official from a cocoa industry body who 
welcomed the prospect of EU PSD support to assist private sector activity in cocoa: 
This region produces over 70% of cocoa…. [assisting the cocoa sector] makes 
more money for families and communities… Donors overs the years have [rightly] 
implemented many projects towards helping improve the livelihoods of 
smallholder cocoa farmers (Interview B; October 2014). 
A representative from a multinational agricultural processing company in Ghana also 
articulated such a pro-poor PSD narrative. He explained that the presence of multinational 
processors brought genuine benefit for poorer people. In particular, he noted his own 
company’s ‘Cocoa Promise’ scheme to promote poverty reduction: 
We have the Cocoa Promise scheme… we reward heroes of sustainability… we 
are encouraging people to stay in the villages… we are providing facilities… 
helping people to go into cocoa farming. (Interview C; October 2014).  
Interestingly, however, there was tension in the ways in which these stakeholders advanced 
pro-poor visions of business growth in the cocoa industry. Some interviewees raised concerns 
about the plight of smallholders, particularly in terms of the behavior of intermediary 
companies who purchase cocoa at the farm-gate. A Nigerian processing manager noted 
smallholders’ reliance upon these intermediaries and their high-interest loans. He 
contextualised this in terms of sometimes non-existent profit margins for smallholders: 
There is 100 Naira input [into the farm by the smallholder] and there is 102 Naira 
output…. It is really about [the smallholder] relying on the cocoa traders to 
survive, seeking loans... [However,] the traders are Shylock… [their loans are] 
double or triple the interest of the bank… they rip off the farmers (Interview D; 
December 2013).  
Many stakeholders similarly emphasised that poverty reduction through private sector activity 
in cocoa was not necessarily automatic, and required active interventions. Many also 
recognised that young people were no longer attracted into the sector. One Ghanaian agro-
processing official explained that ‘agriculture is not attractive to any young person. If you want 
to make money then you create an [mobile phone] App, so why go to the field with a cutlass 
and a hoe?’ (Interview E; October 2014).  
Welcoming national government support for PSD objectives 
Importantly in terms of alignment between interviewee narratives and donor PSD discourse, 
the Ghanaian and Nigerian stakeholders commonly emphasised the need for donor and 
domestic government assistance for private sector activity in the cocoa sector. Government 
support for origin grinding was seen as a particular priority: 
The [Ghanaian] government vision is to add value to raw materials, to cocoa… 
every company dreams of not doing [only] semi-finished but going right up to the 
finished product… [then] we can give back to the people (Interview; June 2017). 
 Nevertheless, interviewees were divided on the record of their own governments. One LBC 
official in Ghananoted the government’s decision to suspend a seed fund which had bolstered 
raw bean production. The official complained that ‘assistance and money is not sufficient in 
Ghana. We wish there was more money’ (Interview F; October 2014). He also noted lack of 
government action to support value-addition: ‘the President talks about it, his plans, but other 
than CPC there is no other [state-run] processor’. Lack of government support for 
diversification into origin grinding was deemed an ongoing problem: 
I would prefer that we process the cocoa in Ghana, here, so we benefit from it. We 
can process it to create employment so that the standard of living can be improved. 
Why should some [foreigners] enjoy the benefit? We should go sell the 
[processed] product instead of sending beans (Interview F; October 2014). 
This LBC official did recognise, however, that the Ghanaian government had offered 
significant assistance in terms of fertilisers and pesticides at farm level:  
The Government of Ghana since 2002/03 is assisting spraying all farms…to 
prevent other diseases which would bring down production. There is a policy of 
assisting fertilisers and production (Interview F; October 2014). 
In a similarly positive narrative, meanwhile, a multinational processing company official 
recognised the help offered by the Ghanaian government in terms of its EPZ regulations: 
[it] gave incentives to build a plant here… There is no tax here for 10 years - that 
attracted companies. Our $100 million investment started in 2008. It is a good 
thing for the country. [We] are paying back... there are 450 employed here… 
(Interview C; October 2014).  
A Ghanaian civil society official augmented this positive perspective and praised the 
government’s efforts to offer a fixed local price to cocoa farmers (Interview J; June 2015). This 
again reiterated the pro-poor PSD potential of the cocoa sector in partial alignment with the 
EU’s own official discourse. 
Interestingly, however, certain West African interviewees did raise queries about local 
incentives for processing and for the export of raw cocoa beans. With regard to the former 
issue, a civil society activist noted that foreign investors often found ways to maintain EPZ 
incentives long after their initial ‘honeymoon’ period had elapsed. He explained that investors 
could establish ‘new’ companies for legal purposes after the expiration of their initial ten-year 
tax exemption, to avoid contributing to government revenues. The stakeholder deemed the 
incentives offered to foreign corporations unfair in relation to the status of local Ghanaian 
businesspeople: 
There are always [tax] loopholes… If a foreigner is coming and gets a 10 year tax 
break, then why not give Ghanaian citizens the same?... If there are Ghanaian 
investors why can’t we do [the same] and create local jobs, and have people 
making money here? (Interview A; October 2014).  
Moreover, in Nigeria, an official in an export association lamented that the government 
continued to subsidise export of raw cocoa beans. The stakeholder explained that a wholescale 
ban on raw cocoa exports would not be feasible but that, nevertheless, the government should 
refrain from actively supporting colonial patterns of trade: 
 [The government] should be adding value, not helping people export the raw 
material… there should be incentive for local capacity, for creating jobs… we 
need industrialisation and they are not supporting industrialisation (Interview G; 
December 2013). 
Interestingly, a processing plant manager cemented this rather negative view. He explained that 
the Nigerian government’s main instrument for assisting farmers – the Coffee Research 
Institute (CRI) – regularly failed to assist farm-level supply side capacity: 
The CRI are on strike… they are supposed to monitor the farms, the extension 
services… we lag behind Cameron, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana… the grounding of 
cocoa is [also] supposed to be controlled [by government]… it’s no longer being 
done as expected to standard… officials are much more interested in collecting 
their fee… (Interview D; December 2013). 
 Significantly, Nigerian interviewees often linked current industry woes to historical 
processes of liberalisation. In particular, one co-operative official explained that liberalisation 
had encouraged European firms to enter the intermediary trade in raw cocoa. Their entry, he 
stated, had resulted in lower quality production. (Interview H; December 2013). Even in the 
partially liberalised Ghanaian sector stakeholders noted the historical role of donors in 
sponsoring disadvantageous liberalisation. A Ghanaian civil society activistnoted how such 
reforms prevented the government from subsiding electricity and other inputs, limiting 
opportunities for pro-poor private sector expansion (Interview A; October 2014).  
Welcoming EU PSD support, yet scepticism regarding aid delivery and the impact of the EPA 
Crucially in terms of a critical understanding of EU PSD discourse in the context of EPAs, 
interviewees voiced strong concerns about trade liberalisation. Nigerian participants, in 
particular, condemned the EU for its apparent strong-arm tactics. The EU’s decision to 
downgrade Nigeria to the GSP was especially deemed to have handicapped cocoa processing. 
A manager at a Nigerian processing unit explained that: 
Exporters [in Nigeria face] 7% tariff and in Ghana [they have a lower tariff at] 
3.5%... it’s affecting reinvestment to grow the farms... the processor is suffering… 
40% are not profitable… [and so] it has become difficult to provide the social 
responsibilities for the farmers too… everyone [in Nigeria] is fighting for their 
own survival… (Interview D; December 2013). 
A Nigerian stakeholder from an export association echoed this view. He noted the heavy tariffs 
placed by Europe on Nigerian value-added cocoa produce compared to tariff free entry for raw 
beans. He deemed this a cynical manoeuvre aimed at perpetuating asymmetric patterns of trade: 
The EU [wants] Nigeria to sign an EPA [which] Nigeria does not think is of 
economic benefit…. On our [processed] goods’ entry to EU, they are 
implementing all kinds of discrimination, but if we export raw cocoa, a duty is not 
applicable. There is 4.2% [tariff] on butter and 6.1% on cocoa cake… it means 
that the [EU] is out to close local industry… the EPA is killing local industry… 
(Interview G; December 2013).  
Ghanaian interviewees also shared this negative view, despite the fact that their processors had 
maintained lower tariff access due to an ‘interim’ EPA in 2008. An official from a Ghanaian 
LBC explained that he viewed the government’s acquiescence to the EU’s interim EPA in terms 
of attempts to maintain foreign aid. He stressed that this undermined sovereignty: 
I don’t like it when you sign such agreements. You don’t have your freedom as a 
sovereign nation… They will dictate to us what to do.… Ghanaians are against 
this [EPA] but the Government needs money… [and so] by force they give in to 
certain policies (Interview F; October 2014). 
While condemning the EPAs, most interviewees were, however, welcoming of any EU PSD 
support. Processors and smallholders concurred that Europe’s financial support would – if 
delivered - see major gains in terms of business growth. One interviewee viewed the EPADP 
as a potential gain– ‘I’m very optimistic about the EPADP. SMEs have a lack of funds and they 
might have help’ (Interview June 2017). However, many stakeholders expressed the need for 
monies to be delivered directly to businesses A Ghanaian civil society activist stated:: 
If the EU gave EURO 5 billion to manage the cost of adjustment, this money, by 
the time it gets to the industries, will have shrank in weight and in volume. The 
only way is for the beneficiaries to apply for the money directly and to target how 
the money will be used  (Interview A; October 2014). 
A Nigerian processing stakeholder contextualised such positive views on potential donor PSD 
assistance in terms of the types of practical issues that EU monies might help with: 
we would like it [EPADP assistance]… We are crying out for research 
intervention… the butterfly moth… was about to ruin 70% of the pods last year… 
the stability of the sector is another issue… the power outages.. there can be four 
within eight hours… that’s a lot of headache and we are losing 30% of capacity… 
(Interview D; December 2013). 
Importantly, however, interviewees contended that the EU had failed to deliver earlier aid 
promises, and remained sceptical whether any future monies would genuinely be used for local 
business initiatives. One Ghanaian cocoa stakeholder explained that: 
we don’t see any funds from PSD finance, these are only opportunities for 
consultants, the EU brings in its own people to disperse the money. They come in 
from the outside, but we don’t have ownership of these policies (Interview K; June 
2015). 
This view was further expressed by a Ghanaian LBC representative who claimed that the EU 
had so far failed to deliver any meaningful assistance: 
If it comes, we would appreciate it [Aid for Trade], but it is not coming. If we had 
more money in the cocoa sector then we could increase the production of cocoa 
[which] is from the hand of the farmer. (Interview F; October 2014). 
Interestingly, certain stakeholders also emphasised the possible benefit of EU PSD support for 
diversification into origin grinding. The Ghanaian LBC official, for instance, deemed value 
addition as a vital strategy to break away from overreliance on raw material exports: 
International organisations should come to Ghana to assist it in building more 
companies rather than commercialise [raw] cocoa, just buying and selling beans, 
which is not good! Instead they should come to help build factories here. 
Individuals will then be producing benefit from their sweat rather than always 
exporting cocoa to other countries (Interview F; October 2014). 
A Nigerian civil society activist, meanwhile, emphasised that the EU’s PSD assistance could 
usefully be delivered to smallholders at local level. He emphasised that many were still living 
in poor conditions: 
We need ECOWAS and the EU… [farmers] are living there in poverty… we need 
support from the Nigerian government and the EU to [fix] what is going on here. 
The middle people are enjoying cocoa products more than the owner [smallholder 
producer]. The middle-men come to buy at a cheap price then sell at a profit 
(Interview I; December 2013). 
Unpacking interviewee narratives on PSD assistance in the PWC 
Overall  the West African interviewees were positive about the potential uses of both 
government and donor PSD assistance for poverty reduction. The stakeholders confirmed that 
they viewed private sector activity as being inevitably bound to wider societal goals regarding 
poverty reduction. In this sense they concurred with donor PSD rationales in the PWC, namely 
that appropriate nation-state or donor institution interventions could make markets work more 
effectively for ‘the poor’. Crucially, however, there was a high degree of interviewee scepticism 
regarding the ability (and willingness) of both domestic government and the EU to tangibly 
deliver meaningful PSD assistance. In the case of Ghanaian and Nigerian governments, there 
was cautious support for greater state intervention in order to remedy many underlying 
weaknesses in the sector..  
 With resonance for a critical understanding of EU PSD rationales in the context of 
EPAs, meanwhile, the interviewees clearly welcomed potential EU support for business 
activities. Interviewees pointed to a number of possible interventions which the EU might make 
to improve cocoa supply-side capacity and the social condition of communities surrounding 
production. The interviewees, however, remained highly sceptical as to whether the EU would 
tangibly deliver on its promises and doubted, if the EU did deliver, whether such monies would 
channel downwards to private sector operators (or whether these monies would be captured by 
governments or by EU consultancy bodies). While concurring with the fundamental principle 
of PSD in the PWC, the interviewees therefore questioned whether the EU would be willing or 
able to bring about poverty reduction since aid monies were not likely to be forthcoming for 
cocoa despite its strategic position as a priority export industry.  
Moreover, the interviewees raised concerns about EPA trade liberalisation, bringing the 
legitimising aspect of EU PSD discourse into critical light. The EU’s pursuit of an EPA was 
widely seen by interviewees as a threat both to cocoa (for instance, Nigeria’s default to the 
GSP) and broader national economic plans. In terms of origin grindings, meanwhile, the 
stakeholders questioned why the EU should levy differential tariffs on processed goods 
compared to raw beans, irrespective of whether an EPA will be concluded. Many viewed the 
EU as utilising cynical protectionist policies to maintain colonial patterns of trade. Furthermore, 
the EU’s threat of escalating tariffs to an even higher level, if a regional EPA is not signed, was 
viewed by the stakeholders as an unfair strategy. It is important to reiterate, however, that 
stakeholders are welcoming of PSD assistance – albeit that this aid should definitely not be tied 
to EPAs. 
 A qualitative fieldwork approach – allied to a CDA perspective – thus sheds critical 
light upon EU PSD discourse in the PWC. It is clear from the analysis of the interviews that, 
contrary to PSD discourse, these ostensible beneficiaries of EPAs in West Africa view the EU’s 
pursuit of free trade deals as developmentally questionable. As interviewees themselves 
emphasised, free trade negotiations pose a number of challenges to genuine PSD in West Africa, 
not least in terms of the EU’s threat to escalate tariffs upon local exporters. Indeed, Nigeria’s 
cocoa processors have already experienced the maleffects of tariff escalation. For many 
interviewees, therefore, the EU is engaging in disciplinary action,compelling ACP states to fall 
into line with liberalisation, or else face high barriers into European markets. Given the pro-
poor language of EU pledges to PSD support this would seem highly questionable in normative 
terms. As stakeholders stressed, EU intervention in pro-poor private sector growth is welcome, 
but this should not be conditional upon EPAs. Given the importance of cocoa production and 
origin grindings for the Ghanaian and Nigerian economies, it would be particularly detrimental 
if sectors such as these were further negatively impacted by EU tariff escalations. From 
interviewees’ standpoint, such key exports sectors must receive sufficient PSD support in a 
trade policy environment that supports West Africa exporters’ low tariff entry into Europe, 
quite regardless of free trade reciprocity. 
 Crucially, the field engagement with West African cocoa business people corroborates 
the critical scholarly literature’s existing scepticism on the role of PSD strategies within the 
wider PWC. While the existing literature has predominantly based this view on the desk 
analysis of donor policy documents, via grounded fieldwork this article has examined 
interviewee narratives as evidence of West African business actors’ concerns regarding the lack 
of tangible PSD support. It is apparent therefore that while PSD discourse plays a crucial role 
in the PWC as a lynchpin of donors’ claims to marry free market reforms to poverty reduction, 
that this does not seem to translate into genuine ‘development’ outcomes within strategic 
sectors such as West African cocoa. Instead, the business people interviewed report a lack of 
tangible donor PSD help, and remain highly sceptical about the willingness of the EU to deliver 
upon its promises. Moreover, they view the EPAs as a potential threat,not an opportunity, for 
pro-poor forms of private sector growth. 
Conclusion 
The above examination of the EU’s use of PSD discourse in the legitimisation of EPA free 
market reform in ACP countries has drawn critical attention to wider problems associated with 
donor thinking in the PWC. Donorsfrequently deploy PSD discourse as a means of justifying 
extensive free market reforms in developing countries as being conducive to poverty reduction. 
Nominally learning the lessons of ‘big bang’ liberalisation in the earlier Washington 
Consensus, donors claim that PSD support for developing countries’ priority business sectors 
will ensure that they can now deliver jobs, growth and poverty alleviation within open markets. 
Following PWC rationales about the necessity for nation-states’ and donor institutions’ 
interventions to make markets work more effectively for the poor, PSD support is viewed as a 
vital tool for aligning free market policies to moral goals of ‘development’ in the Global South. 
 The article’s assessment of interviewees’ narratives in the West African cocoa sector, 
however, corroborates the existing critical scholarly literature’s scepticism regarding the 
willingness and ability of donor actors to meaningfully deliver PSD support (see for instance 
Onis and Senses 2005; Orbie 2007; Langan 2011; Fine and Saad-Filho 2014; Mawdsley 2015; 
Mawdsley et al 2018). While the interviewees were welcoming of any potential PSD assistance 
and concured that such support might engender forms of poverty reduction, nevertheless, they 
doubted that such monies would be forthcoming. And crucially they challenged the tying of 
such PSD support to disadvantageous free market reforms, in this case the EPAs. Indeed, the 
interviewees’ narratives also corroborated the critical literature’s overarching concerns 
regarding the premise that free market policies will lead to poverty reduction (even if PSD 
monies were to be forthcoming). Premature trade liberalisation via EPAs was viewed by 
interviewees as an underlying threat, not an opportunity, in terms of the flourishing of 
businesses in West Africa. Thus they believed that PSD monies should not, in any 
circumstance, be made conditional upon the implementation of free trade policies, in this case 
the EU’s EPA agenda in West Africa. 
 Finally, the article has demonstrated the utility of a CDA perspective married to field 
engagement with the private sector in developing country contexts. The application of CDA to 
the analysis of interviewee transcripts has enabled the article to cast critical light upon the 
official discourse of the EU in its justification of EPAs and onto the wider premise of the PWC 
itself – namely that donor interventions for PSD initiatives in the Global South can make free 
market policies ‘development friendly’. It is clear from the field engagement that such 
discourse does not appear to be matched by donor action in the case of West Africa’s cocoa 
sector. While  PSD discourse is utilised to justify the pursuit of far-reaching free market 
reforms, the interviewed cocoa stakeholders corroborate critical scholars’ existing concerns 
about the strategic functions of PSD in the PWC.  
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